Cloud Native Days Italy 2027: Building the Community, Together

Cloud Native Days Italy 2027: Building the Community, Together There is something special about community events. They bring together people who might otherwise know each other only through GitHub, Slack, mailing lists, conference talks, or open-source projects. They create space for conversations that don’t fit into a talk abstract, for experiences that are best shared face to face, and for connections that often continue long after the event is over. ...

November 2, 2026 · 5 min · 885 words · Matteo Bisi

OVHcloud CLI Supply Chain Compromise: A User Playbook

On 19 October 2026, a supply chain compromise replaced GitHub release binaries of the official OVHcloud CLI (ovhcloud-cli) with a credential stealer for about ninety minutes. Anyone who installed from GitHub, Homebrew, or the project’s install script in that window could have received malware instead of a cloud tool. The source repository was clean. The build pipeline was clean. The files on the release page were not. OpenSourceMalware reconstructed the incident: timeline, how the assets were swapped, how the malicious build was identified, GlassWorm indicators, hashes. OVHcloud published a security advisory the next day, pulled the bad files the same afternoon, and shipped a clean immutable v0.16.0. ...

October 21, 2026 · 7 min · 1335 words · Matteo Bisi

You Built and Signed Your SBOM. Now What? Store, Verify, Manage

Javier Martinez published a sharp piece on September 24, 2026: Why are SBOMs failing to stop supply chain attacks? I agree with his analysis. I recommend reading it before continuing here. TLDR of the Sysdig Article Martinez starts from a simple idea. An SBOM plus signatures and attestations should give us attribution (who built it), provenance (where it comes from) and content (what is inside). In a Kubernetes flow that means verifying attestations before deploy, then generating and signing your own SBOM when you ship. ...

October 6, 2026 · 11 min · 2329 words · Matteo Bisi

MicroVMs vs Containers for AI Agents: ECB Cybersecurity Guide

AI agents have turned sandboxing from an engineering detail into a leadership decision. A capable agent can install tools, read source code, build experiments, retry failed approaches, and search for a path out of its environment for hours. The old question, “Do we have a sandbox?”, is no longer enough. Trail of Bits showed why in its VM escape experiment with a cyber-capable AI agent. The agent repeatedly escaped a QEMU/KVM environment by combining known but unpatched host weaknesses, fixes not yet included in the distribution, and eventually new vulnerabilities. The lesson is not that virtual machines are useless. It is that no technical boundary provides complete containment on its own. ...

September 21, 2026 · 9 min · 1728 words · Matteo Bisi

Kubernetes 1.37 Security: 3 Stable Advances, 3 Future Signals

Kubernetes 1.37, named Garhwal, was released on August 26, 2026. It contains 67 enhancements, with 16 reaching stable status. The security story is clear. Kubernetes 1.37 strengthens workload identity, trust distribution, and SELinux enforcement today. It also introduces early capabilities that point to better policy protection, safer writable storage, and more resilient recovery tomorrow. For customer decision-makers, the long feature list is not the point. The important question is whether the release helps organisations protect customer data and keep critical services trustworthy. These six features are the most useful answer. ...

September 4, 2026 · 7 min · 1286 words · Matteo Bisi

Back to Basics: TLS and PKI from the Ground Up

This is the third article in my “Back to Basics” series. The goal is simple: take something modern engineers interact with daily through abstractions, and explain what is actually happening underneath. In the first article, I hardened an SSH daemon and explained why the defaults are insecure. In the second, I showed that containers are ordinary Linux processes wrapped in namespaces and cgroups. This article applies the same approach to TLS: strip away the abstractions, read the raw structures, and understand what the tooling is doing on your behalf. ...

June 29, 2026 · 16 min · 3266 words · Matteo Bisi

Athena Coalition: Coordinated Open Source Defense in the AI Vulnerability Era

The Problem We Have Today Open source security is no longer limited by finding vulnerabilities. It is limited by coordination. Modern software depends on thousands of open source components: libraries, container images, build tools, package managers, CI/CD actions, and infrastructure projects. When a serious vulnerability appears, many teams still struggle with basic questions. Question Why it is hard Where is the vulnerable component running? SBOMs and inventories are often incomplete. Who owns the remediation? Dependencies cross teams, vendors, and platforms. Can we patch fast enough? Testing, release windows, and legacy systems slow everything down. What if no clean patch exists yet? Teams need mitigations, not only advisories. AI makes this harder. Frontier models can inspect code, reason across dependencies, and find chained vulnerabilities faster than traditional disclosure processes were designed to handle. Discovery is accelerating. Exploitation windows are shrinking. ...

June 16, 2026 · 4 min · 711 words · Matteo Bisi

Cloud Native Days Italy 2026: A Wrap-Up from Bologna

Bologna, May 18-19: The Fifth Edition Bologna, May 18-19, 2026. The fifth edition of Cloud Native Days Italy is behind us, and I’m still riding the wave of energy it left behind. Writing this post as one of the organizers feels different from a regular conference recap. Seeing something you worked on for months actually land — with real people in real rooms — is hard to describe briefly. If you want to read how the journey to this edition started, I covered it in an earlier post. ...

May 22, 2026 · 4 min · 761 words · Matteo Bisi

Lazarus Group Hides Malware in Git Hooks to Target Developers

A few months back I saw a post circulating on LinkedIn about a developer who had been targeted by a fake recruiter. The person had been invited to a “technical assessment,” cloned a repository, and ran the code provided as part of the interview. What followed was a silent drain of every credential stored on their machine. I remember reading it and feeling a specific kind of disgust, not just at the technical sophistication of the attack, but at the deliberate choice to weaponize something as emotionally charged as a job search. ...

May 6, 2026 · 6 min · 1236 words · Matteo Bisi

Supply Chain Attacks Won't Stop: 8 Controls to Reduce Your Exposure

It Happened Again On April 22, 2026, the official Bitwarden CLI npm package (@bitwarden/cli) was compromised. For roughly 90 minutes, between 5:57 PM and 7:30 PM ET, anyone who ran npm install @bitwarden/cli received a malicious package. Around 334 developers did exactly that. The attackers did not break into Bitwarden’s npm account directly. Instead, they hijacked a GitHub Actions workflow in Bitwarden’s CI/CD pipeline and weaponised npm’s Trusted Publishing mechanism to push a poisoned release. Trusted Publishing is OIDC-based and requires no stored credentials: it was introduced as a hardening measure after credential-based attacks. It became the entry point. ...

April 26, 2026 · 12 min · 2439 words · Matteo Bisi